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THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING:  A CALL FOR A 
DIRECTIVE, GOAL-ORIENTED PRINCIPLE TO 
GUIDE THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION BY 
FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 
Mark Osler* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Power Games and Sentencing Law 
In the past few years, nowhere has power shifted so quickly and so 
violently within the Federal Courts as it has in the realm of sentencing.1  
In 2003, Congress flexed its muscles, took power from judges, and 
reapportioned it to prosecutors through the Feeney Amendment.2  Then, 
in January 2005, the Supreme Court dramatically ruled in United States v. 
Booker3 that the federal sentencing guidelines could no longer be 
mandatory, thus jerking discretion away from prosecutors and giving it 
back to judges.4  Now, some in Congress seem poised once again to take 
charge and shift power to prosecutors yet again.5  This epic battle 
between the judicial and legislative branches of government over the 
power accorded to the administrative branch (in the person of the 
                                                 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Baylor Law School, J.D. Yale Law School, B.A., William 
and Mary.  The author would like to thank Charles Brancaccio, who provided research 
assistance for this project, and Professor Steven Chanenson of the Villanova University 
School of Law, who provided a number of important insights and ideas after viewing an 
early draft of this article. 
1 Shifts in power are inevitable, of course, where three branches of government compete 
for power.  Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 811, 812 (2002). 
2 See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today 
(“PROTECT Act”) of 2003 Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 650 (2003).  For a good 
discussion of the way the Feeney Act achieved this, see David M. Zlotnick, The War Within 
the War on Crime:  The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 
211 (2004).  It accomplished this shift by new rules, such as the rule requiring that the 
prosecutor file a motion if the defendant is to get the full measure of credit for “acceptance 
of responsibility” and pleading guilty.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) 
(2002). 
3 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
4 Id. at 756. 
5 Significantly, this includes Representative Tom Feeney of Florida, author of the 
Feeney Amendment, who on the day of the Booker decision announced that “[t]he Supreme 
Court’s decision to place this extraordinary power to sentence a person solely in the hands 
of a single federal judge—who is accountable to no one—flies in the face of the clear will of 
Congress.”  Press Release, Tom Feeney, Feeney Comments on Supreme Court Sentencing 
Ruling (Jan. 12, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/fl24_feeney/ 
SupremeCourtOpinion.html. 
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prosecutor) is far from finished.  To key players like Justice Breyer, this 
fluctuation may feel somewhat like playing tennis,6 but to criminal 
practitioners it may be more akin to being the scuffed-up yellow ball 
being whacked from baseline to baseline.7 
B. The Constant of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Regardless of where we are in this battle, one constant remains:  
Even given these sudden shifts, federal prosecutors today still wield 
tremendous discretion, even if it is less than that accorded to judges (for 
the moment).8  Though they may not have the same ability post-Booker to 
leverage mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, prosecutors retain the power 
to guide investigations, accept or decline cases, draft charges, press for 
convictions through plea negotiation, and seek specific sentences.9 
 Beneath this continuing truth lies a crucial question:  What 
guides federal prosecutors in exercising this discretion?  One would 
think there would be an easy answer, a directive, goal-oriented principle 
that would consistently guide those important choices.10  There is not.11  
Rather, discretion is exercised in an inconsistent manner by local U.S. 
Attorneys and Assistant U.S. Attorneys, who each employ their own 
distinctive and personal set of guiding principles.12  For all that the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) does, in the end it fails to direct any kind 
of principled, consistent exercise of discretion by hundreds of federal 
prosecutors.  Instead, those prosecutors revolve in their own orbits of 
                                                 
6 In Booker, Justice Breyer used the tennis analogy in concluding that “[o]urs, of course, 
is not the last word:  The ball now lies in Congress’ court.”  Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768. 
7 Both prosecutors and defense attorneys face the challenge of keeping pace with 
changing law.  However, it may be more of a challenge for defense attorneys who maintain 
federal criminal practice as only a fraction of their work, compared to the prosecutor who 
does all of her work in federal court. 
8 Some, I suspect, would say that prosecutors, even after Booker, have more power than 
judges.  William J. Stuntz of Harvard has persuasively argued that the tremendous breadth 
of a prosecutor’s discretion is taken largely from the legislature, not judges, and is largely 
built on a pathological overcriminalization via the expansion of the federal penal code.  See 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).  He 
believes that “[a]s criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the 
hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison 
and for how long.”  Id at 509. 
9 See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 395-423 (1992) 
(discussing the powers of prosecutors prior to Booker). 
10 I describe this guiding directive as a principle because that word seems the truest fit.  
The dictionary defines a “principle” as “a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine or 
assumption.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 987 (11th ed. 2004). 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 See infra Part III. 
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personal morality, a constellation of independent stars and galaxies each 
with their own hue of light.13 
This article calls for a change.  Specifically, it asks the Attorney 
General to articulate a directive, goal-oriented principle that would allow 
for the consistent and principled exercise of discretion and a true moral 
voice for the DOJ.   
C. Discretion in the Real World 
A young Assistant U.S. Attorney in a large city sits in a conference 
room with several agents of the local narcotics task force.  The task force 
is presenting a case investigation, involving a conspiracy that is shipping 
cocaine into the city and distributing it.  The agents have identified the 
following three levels of involvement:  the leader of the organization, who 
directs the actions of others and retains the majority of the profits; three 
managers who subdivide bulk shipments and handle cash; and six dealers 
who sell the cocaine locally.  The agents are ready to turn the case over 
for indictment or to continue the investigation without a charge.  Either 
way, it would be helpful in making the case if some of the defendants 
would offer information and testimony against the others. 
Over the course of this case, the prosecutor will wield tremendous 
discretion at every stage.  Starting from the meeting with the agents and 
moving forward chronologically, the prosecutor will make key 
discretionary decisions not only in directing the investigation but also in 
accepting or declining the case for prosecution,14 choosing what charge 
to lodge against each defendant,15 crafting plea agreements,16 and 
making sentencing recommendations to the court.17  At each stage, as 
part of these decisions, she will also have to evaluate which defendants 
                                                 
13 To complete the analogy, Assistant U.S. Attorneys acting on their own would be stars, 
and groups of them clustered together under a U.S. Attorney would be a galaxy. 
14 Some commentators see this as an especially important area of prosecutorial 
discretion, as it is wholly unreviewable and not subjected to “rigorous checks and 
balances” found in other areas of the prosecutor’s work.  Michael Edmund O’Neill, When 
Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 
222-23 (2003). 
15 The power to charge is now so fully in the prosecutor’s hands that the Grand Jury 
may not issue an indictment without the signature of the prosecutor.  FED. R. CRIM. P.  
7(c)(1). 
16  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
17 Some sentencing choices, such as whether to adjust the sentence for cooperation after 
the initial sentencing, can only be addressed upon the motion of the prosecutor.  FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 35(b). 
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should be allowed to cooperate with the government and receive a break 
at sentencing in return.   
Different guiding principles will lead in radically different 
directions.  Quite simply, if the prosecutor wants to lower crime by 
taking out those best able to run a drug organization, she will allow the 
lower-level dealers to cooperate against the others.  On the other hand, if 
she wants to pursue as many lawbreakers as possible, she may choose to 
allow the leader to testify against all the others.   
At present, how to approach the case is decided at the local level.18  
Without a national directive in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 
we are left to guess what will be important in any given case.  Currently, 
the DOJ lacks a consistent moral voice, set of goals, or meaningful role in 
the larger political debate in our country. 
D. A Call to Principle   
The prosecutor described above is making important decisions on 
behalf of the larger society, largely without directive guidance.  In 
attacking this lack of principle, this Article begins by briefly describing 
the following two ways in which federal prosecutors are unique:  first, in 
their accumulation of power relative to others; and second, in their 
independence from an electorate.  Next, in Part III, this Article examines 
the guidance in exercising discretion that federal prosecutors do receive.  
In Part IV, this Article sets out several types of guiding principles and 
discusses their relative merits.  Finally, in Part V, this Article addresses 
problems with the present system and the changes that a centralized, 
directive principle might make in the practice of federal criminal law, 
using the key-man principle as an example. 
However, this Article is not about prosecutorial “ethics,” as ethics 
are generally addressed in codes of behavior that still allow prosecutors 
great amounts of discretion19—that is, what I am interested in here is not 
ethics, but the principled use of discretion within the bounds already set 
by ethical codes.  Further, I do not seek to weigh in on the validity of the 
Sentencing Guidelines or sentencing reform in the wake of Booker, which 
I have already done elsewhere in articles and in testimony before the 
                                                 
18 See infra Part III. 
19 For example, in Texas the code of ethics permits prosecutors to prosecute any charge 
“supported by probable cause.”  Texas Rules of Professional Conduct, TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, art. 10, § 9, R. 3.09(a) (Vernon 1998). 
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U.S. Sentencing Commission.20  Nor is it a critique of the policies of the 
U.S. Justice Department.21  Finally, it is not an attempt to weigh in on the 
debate over whether prosecutorial discretion is a good or bad thing; 
rather, I am using this moment to argue that prosecutors should use the 
discretion that they do have in a way that consistently follows publicly 
articulated, goal-oriented principles that are specific enough to direct 
discrete actions.  What, exactly, is the “justice” being pursued by our 
increasingly powerful DOJ?  It is time to put some meat on those bones 
and flesh out the exact nature of this justice that we are pursuing with 
such expense and intensity. 
II.  THE UNIQUE ROLE OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 
Federal prosecutors are unique in the realm of criminal law in at 
least two respects.  First, they have more power than almost anyone in 
the federal system (even after Booker).22  Second, unlike nearly all state 
prosecutors,23 they are not elected,24 but rather, they are removed by 
several levels from an official (the President of the United States) who is 
publicly elected.  Thus, federal prosecutors do not need to prepare for or 
respond to the expression of public will embodied in elections.25  Because 
prosecutors simply have more discretion than anyone else (save the 
judge) and because they do not have elections as a check on their actions, 
the articulation of guiding, directive principles on the use of such 
discretion is made more important.   
                                                 
20 See WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF MARK OSLER BEFORE THE U.S. SENTENCING COMM. (Nov. 
17, 2004), available at www.ussc.gov/hearings/11_16_04/osler.pdf; Mark Osler, Indirect 
Harms and Proportionality: The Upside-Down World of Federal Sentencing, 74 MISS. L. J. (2005) 
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Osler, Indirect Harms]; Mark Osler, The Blakely Problem and the 3x 
Solution, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 344 (2004) [hereinafter Osler, The Blakely Problem]; Mark Osler, 
Uniformity and the Death of Traditional Sentencing Goals in the Age of Feeney, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 
253 (2004); Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost:  Traditional Sentencing Goals, The False Trail of 
Uniformity and Process, and the Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L.REV. 649 (2003) [hereinafter Osler, 
Must Have Got Lost]. 
21 Admittedly, implicit in my argument is a critique of the DOJ insofar as it has failed to 
adopt the type of principle I urge here. 
22 Much of the power accorded prosecutors will continue under advisory guidelines.  
For example, it will still require a prosecutor’s recommendation to get out from under a 
mandatory minimum sentence.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000). 
23 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Prosecutors in State Courts, 
2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 2 (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Prosecutors in State 
Courts] (noting that only Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and New Jersey do 
not elect their chief prosecutors). 
24 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
25 See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 544. 
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A. Empowered Prosecutors 
1. Power Under Advisory Guidelines 
Even under the post-Booker regime, which may change at any 
moment, should Congress enact new laws, prosecutors would wield 
tremendous power.  The shift to advisory guidelines does not mean all 
former powers of prosecutors evaporate.  Many judges may choose to 
follow the lead of the first federal District Court judge to rule in the post-
Booker environment, Paul G. Cassell of Utah.26  In a ruling the day after 
Booker was announced, Cassell ruled that he would continue to give the 
guidelines “considerable weight” in sentencing, and he proceeded to 
sentence the defendant precisely as the guidelines directed.27  So long as 
judges similarly follow old practices, prosecutors’ power will be 
undiminished.28 
2. The Power to Evade Mandatory Minimums 
Further, the Booker decision still leaves the discretion to evade 
mandatory minimums solely in the hands of prosecutors.29  The judge, in 
contrast, has no similar unilateral method by which to evade mandatory 
minimums.30  If a prosecutor charges the case as a qualifying felony, 
provides notice, and the defendant is properly convicted by plea or at 
trial, the judge does not have the option of reducing the sentence below 
the minimum.31  Understandably, this has led to some resentment on the 
part of the judiciary and others.32  Even from the bench, some federal 
judges have expressed their anger.33 
                                                 
26 United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (2005).  Only a few days after Wilson was 
decided, federal District Court Judge Lynn Adelman of Wisconsin took a contrary view, 
holding that “[t]he approach espoused in Wilson is inconsistent with the holdings of the 
merits majority in Booker. . . .”  United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985 (E.D. Wis. 
2005). 
27 Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d. at 925. 
28 Notably, the Wilson decision did not involve considerations such as cooperation with 
the government, which may have brought other factors into play.  Id. at 926-31. 
29 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000). 
30 See Id. 
31 See Id. 
32 Mandatory minimum sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 841 have been especially 
controversial.  In a recent book, even radio comedian Garrison Keillor specifically criticized 
this law, stating: 
[M]andatory minimum sentences for minor drug possession–
guidelines in the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act that sailed through 
Congress without benefit of public hearings, drafted before an election 
by Democrats afraid to be labeled ‘soft on drugs’–and so a marijuana 
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3. The Power of the Cornucopia of Possible Charges 
Moreover, much of the power of the prosecutor has nothing to do 
with the sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums.  The 
prosecutor’s power flows from the vast array of choices federal law 
allows in charging a criminal case.34  This subject cannot be addressed 
without mentioning the work of William Stuntz, who asserts that this 
smorgasbord of prosecutorial options effectively shifts both lawmaking 
and adjudication to a third party, the prosecutor,35 and then leaves that 
absolute discretion in the hands of prosecutors, “subject to no review by 
anyone else.”36  This results in a system which is needlessly arbitrary 
because it “suffers from both too much law and too much discretion.”37  
Stuntz proposes two solutions to this problem of pathological over-
criminalization:  Either severely limit prosecutorial discretion, or take the 
job of crafting the penal code away from Congress.38  Here, I propose a 
different solution to the same problem, which requires neither the 
external limitation of prosecutorial discretion nor the abdication of an 
essential function by Congress. The overbroad discretion should not be 
limited by a warring outside force, or massive changes in the law, but by 
the simple articulation of principle by the nation’s chief law enforcement 
officer.39 
                                                                                                             
grower can land in prison for life without parole while a murderer 
might be in for eight years; no rational person can defend this, it is a 
Dostoevskian nightmare and it exists only because politicians fled in 
the face of danger.” 
GARRISON KEILLOR, HOMEGROWN DEMOCRAT 100-01 (Viking 2004).  This is not so different 
than the point Harvard Law School’s Stuntz makes in saying that “both major parties have 
participated in a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate the label ‘tough on 
crime.’”  Stuntz, supra note 8, at 509. 
33 Perhaps most notably, former U.S. Attorney and thirteen-year federal judge John S. 
Martin resigned and published an article in the New York Times asserting that he no longer 
wanted to be part of an “unjust” system.  John S. Martin, Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31. 
34 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-2721 (2000).  Some penal laws, of course, are found in other sections 
of the federal code, such as the codification of many narcotics trafficking laws.  See, e.g., 21 
U.S.C. § 841. 
35 Stuntz, supra note 8, at 509. 
36 William J. Stuntz, Reply:  Criminal Law’s Pathology, 101 MICH. L. REV. 828, 838 (2002). 
37 Stuntz, supra note 8, at 579. 
38 Id. 
39 See infra Part V. 
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B. The Unelected Prosecutor 
Unfortunately, the shift in discretion combines with a problem 
unique to the federal system making principles important.  Because 
prosecutors are not elected in the federal system,40 they avoid having to 
articulate principles publicly (in an election campaign) or to be subjected 
to public scrutiny that compares those stated principles to their actions 
(in subsequent elections).41  Thus, we are shifting power to an entity with 
no need to respond to the will of the public. 
In most states, the voting public elects a District Attorney, who then 
determines the policies governing prosecution in that district.42  Elections 
force principles into the mix in two ways:  first, they force prosecutors to 
state a reason, usually a principle, that they should be elected; second, 
they must run on their record once elected, and much of that record is, 
specifically, their employment of discretion that will be compared to the 
principle they articulated.43  For example, if a candidate for District 
Attorney declares that she will seek jail time for all drunk drivers, she is 
making a promise about her future use of discretion that articulates the 
principle of similar treatment for all offenders, regardless of the 
situation.  If the majority of voters agree, she is elected; if not, she loses.44  
If elected, and she starts to allow probation for drunk drivers, it is likely 
someone will run against her, decrying her broken promises.  Thus, there 
is within the system some requirement that prosecutors articulate 
principles and live by them in their exercise of discretion. 
There is no similar check within the federal system, no direct election 
to force the definition and articulation of guiding principles.45  Rather, 
the President appoints and the Senate confirms ninety-three U.S. 
Attorneys, who serve at the pleasure of the President.46  The DOJ, and its 
head, the Attorney General, can and do issue directives that bear on the 
                                                 
40 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
41 See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 544. 
42 Prosecutors in State Courts, supra note 23, at 2 (noting that only Alaska, Connecticut, the 
District of Columbia, and New Jersey do not elect their chief prosecutors). 
43 See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 544 (“Local district attorneys charge murders and rapes and 
robberies and drug deals because the local population demands it.”). 
44 See id. 
45 William Stuntz argues that this allows federal prosecutors to focus on their own career 
advancement by, for example, pursuing high profile cases rather than the cases that make a 
bigger difference in society.  Id. 
46 Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of Business Scandals 2002-2003: 
On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer’s Clash with Donaldson over Turf, the Choice of Civil or 
Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 444 
n.4 (2004). 
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employment of discretion,47 but these are rarely if ever an issue in the 
election of Presidents.  For example, in 2003, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft toughened the internal DOJ guidelines for charging defendants, 
directing that prosecutors, with limited exceptions, charge “the most 
serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the 
facts of the case.”48  Though many viewed this guideline as a significant 
change,49 it was hardly an important issue in the presidential election of 
2004.  
Thus, unelected prosecutors in the federal system are only in the 
most indirect way forced to respond to public will or to articulate and 
defend the use of discretion, in sharp contrast to state prosecutors who 
can be thrown out every few years if they are out of step with the beliefs 
of the local public or untrue to their promises.  
III.  THE FAILURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO ARTICULATE 
PRINCIPLES 
Given the lack of elections to force the articulation of principles, it 
may not be surprising that the DOJ, through the Attorney General or 
elsewhere, has failed to assert the type of discretion-guiding principle 
discussed here.50  At best, the DOJ has in the recent past pushed its 
prosecutors to treat defendants harshly, though even this does not 
appear to be consistently tied to any principle. 
There are two national sources for guiding principles for prosecutors 
who actually try cases, including:  Directives from the Attorney General 
and the United States Attorney’s Manual (“Manual”), which sets out the 
policies for the DOJ.  These two, of course, are mutually reinforcing—
directives from the Attorney General will presumably be incorporated 
into the Manual.51  Unfortunately, neither of these sources has recently 
espoused directives that meet the definition of principle I am using here.  
Guiding principles should be goal-oriented, directive to prosecutors in 
                                                 
47 See Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, to All Federal Prosecutors 
(Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516. 
htm. [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum]. 
48 Id. at 2. 
49 But see David Hechler, Some See Little Change, Others a Mired System; Ashcroft Echoes 
Thornburgh, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 29, 2003, at 25. 
50 See infra Part III.A.- B. 
51 For example, the gist of the Ashcroft Memo was incorporated into the U.S. Attorney’s 
Manual at 9-27.300.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.300, available at 
www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm [hereinafter 
MANUAL]. 
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the primary areas where discretion is employed, and consistently 
applied. 
A. Directives of the Attorney General 
Perhaps the closest we have come to an articulation of guiding 
principle is Attorney General Ashcroft’s 2003 memorandum regarding 
charging procedures.52  That memo, issued to “all federal prosecutors,”53 
directed prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious, readily 
provable offense,”54 with six exceptions, which include the defendant’s 
cooperation with the government (which, pursuant to the memo, can 
lead to either a reduction in sentence or no charge at all)55 and other 
“exceptional” cases in which a supervisor’s approval is received.56  In 
that document, Ashcroft claimed that the new rules were imposed 
because, “[f]undamental fairness requires that all defendants prosecuted 
in the federal criminal justice system be subject to the same standards 
and treated in a consistent manner.”57   
While widely attacked as limiting the discretion of individual 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys,58 a criticism that to some degree is probably 
true, the Ashcroft memorandum does not meet the definition used here 
for principled guidance (directive, goal-oriented, and consistent).  First, 
while it may be considered nominally goal-oriented in stating that it 
seeks to subject criminals to the same standard and is consistent with the 
across-the-board approach discussed in Part IV.A, it only affects one of 
several areas of prosecutorial discretion.59  Second, even with this limited 
application, the exceptions to the rule undermine any consistent 
achievement of that goal, and the federal system of prosecution is too 
decentralized for such a loose policy to have consistent effect.60  
Nor is the Ashcroft memorandum very directive.  On its face, the 
memorandum is not very directive as to two of the most important 
aspects of discretion available to federal prosecutors:  whether to charge 
                                                 
52 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 47. 
53 Id. at 1. 
54 Id. at 2. 
55 Id. at 3. 
56 Id. at 4. 
57 Id. at 6. 
58 See Amie N. Ely, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The Ashcroft 
Memorandum’s Curtailment of the Prosecutor’s Duty to “Seek Justice,” 90 CORNELL L. REV. 237 
(2004). 
59 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 47. 
60 Id. at 2-4. 
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at all61 and whether to dole out breaks in exchange for cooperation with 
the government.  While the memorandum does make an exception to the 
rule for those who cooperate,62 it does not offer further guidance on the 
crucial question of who gets the advantage of that exception, other than 
to require (as do the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines) that the assistance be 
substantial.63  Thus, it offers no direction to the Assistant U.S. Attorney 
described in the hypothetical at the start of this Article.64  Nor is the 
general directive of the Ashcroft Memorandum likely to be consistently 
employed, given the broad ability of nearly one hundred U.S. Attorneys 
to alter its terms on a case-by-case basis. 
While it is fair to say that the Ashcroft Memorandum limits 
discretion, it cannot be said in equal measure that it provides principled, 
goal-oriented, and consistent guidance in the employment of discretion.  
Simply limiting discretion by demanding the harshest possible outcome 
is not a principled act without an honest articulation of the broader goals 
sought.65 
B. The U.S. Attorney’s Manual  
The Manual is a book issued by the DOJ to U.S. Attorneys and their 
Assistants, setting out policies relating to prosecution.66  At least 
nominally, it strives to set out principles, as well:  Section 9-27, in fact, is 
titled “Principles of Federal Prosecution.”67  It sets out several sections 
specifically devoted to initiating prosecution,68 selecting charges,69 
drafting plea agreements,70 and entering into non-prosecution 
agreements in exchange for cooperation.71  
One would hope that the Manual would provide exactly the sort of 
directive, goal-oriented principle capable of consistent application 
described here, but the Manual fails on all three counts.  It is neither 
directive nor formulated in furtherance of a discernable goal of criminal 
                                                 
61 As noted above, William Stuntz has argued that this is the most significant area of 
discretion.  Supra Part II.A.3. 
62 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 47, at 3. 
63 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2002). 
64 See supra Part I.C. 
65 The Ashcroft memo cannot be seen as mandating the across-the-board principle, for 
the reasons set out infra Part IV.A. 
66 MANUAL, supra note 51. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. §§ 9-27.200-270. 
69 Id. §§ 9-27.300-320. 
70 Id. §§ 9-27.400-450. 
71 Id. §§ 9-27.600-640. 
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law, and the direction it does provide is not capable of consistent 
application.   
1. The Manual Is Not Directive  
The first order of business in articulating principles through the 
Manual, it seems, is to put away any sense that the Manual is to provide 
concrete direction to individual prosecutors.  Almost immediately, the 
Manual announces that “it is not intended that reference to these 
principles will require a particular prosecutorial decision in any given 
case.”72  Rather than providing firm direction, the Manual is best viewed 
as being vaguely advisory,73 and further it hedges being directive at 
nearly every point of discrete decision by leaving real decision-making to 
the local level.   
Consider, for example, the crucial discretion accorded prosecutors in 
deciding who may be afforded a sentencing break for cooperation.  On 
this point, the Manual provides almost no guidance, saying only that the 
prosecutor should weigh “all relevant considerations,” including:   
 (1) The importance of the investigation or prosecution 
to an effective program of law enforcement; (2) The 
value of the person’s cooperation to the investigation or 
prosecution; and (3) The person’s relative culpability in 
connection with the offense or offenses being 
investigated or prosecuted and his/her history with 
respect to criminal activity.74   
Certainly, these are important considerations, but they are not 
directive in a given case where several candidates for cooperation 
present themselves.  For example, it is the most culpable target who 
almost always will have the most useful information, putting the first 
consideration in conflict with the third.  In a real case, such as the one 
described at the start of this Article,75 it does little to push the prosecutor 
toward using either the leader, the managers, or the dealers as 
cooperators. 
                                                 
72 Id. § 9-27.120(B). 
73 This vagueness may be intentional, so as to avoid creating a cause of action for 
defendants.  However, this seems to be expressly barred by the text of the Manual.  Id. § 9-
27.150. 
74 Id. § 9-27.620. 
75 See supra Part I.C. 
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Elsewhere, the Manual cedes near-total authority to local supervisors 
who need only to articulate their reasoning.  For example, in discussing 
the charges to be brought, the Manual sounds tough in saying (consistent 
with the Ashcroft memorandum)76 that prosecutors should charge “the 
most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant’s 
conduct and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction.”77  In the 
end, however, the Manual allows that a prosecutor “may drop readily 
provable charges with the specific approval of the U.S. Attorney or 
designated supervisory level official for reasons set forth in the file of the 
case.”78  Thus, provided she can talk a supervisor into it, any charge can 
be dropped.79  The Manual then goes so far as to suggest very broad 
reasons that a supervisor may want to approve dropping charges, 
including “because the United States Attorney’s Office is particularly 
overburdened,”80 and “the case would be time-consuming to try.”81   
Given that the Manual would provide support for nearly any 
decision as to the selection of cooperators and charges, it can hardly be 
seen as directive. 
2. The Manual Is Not Goal-Oriented 
The key to a principled system in the concrete and steel world of 
prosecution is that it firmly focus on a goal.  Unfortunately, the Manual 
offers no consistent articulation of what it hopes to achieve in real terms 
subject to evaluation, and the direction it does offer is not informed by 
any such over-arching goal. 
The goals it does articulate are unimpeachable but ultimately 
meaningless; the preface to the Principle of Federal Prosecution, for 
example, proudly announces that:  
The availability of this statement of principles to Federal 
law enforcement officials and to the public serves two 
important purposes: ensuring the fair and effective 
exercise of prosecutorial responsibility by attorneys for 
the government, and promoting confidence on the part 
of the public and individual defendants that important 
                                                 
76 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 47, at 1. 
77 MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.300. 
78 Id. § 9-27-400(B). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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prosecutorial decisions will be made rationally and 
objectively on the merits of each case.82  
I think it is a good idea for prosecutorial decisions to be made 
“rationally.”83  Few could argue with prosecutors being “fair and 
effective.”84  The problem is that to the Assistant U.S. Attorney deciding 
who gets a break for cooperation, the goals of acting rationally and fairly 
do not address the issues at hand, as there are many rational and fair 
options available.85  Sadly, this is as close as the Manual gets to 
articulating an overarching and principled goal for the project of federal 
prosecution. 
Within the specific directives of the Manual, vague as they are, there 
is also little one could call goal-oriented.  For example, the suggestion 
that the most serious readily provable offense be charged (unless, of 
course, the office is busy or the case might prove time-consuming),86 
goes nominally towards the goal of prosecuting all offenders to the 
fullest extent possible.  This goal, however, is undercut not only by the 
exceptions built into the charging directive87 but also by the Manual’s 
own discussion of those for whom the prosecutor can decline 
prosecution,88 citing that the offense does not seem very serious,89 that 
the target has not been in trouble before,90 that the target is old (or 
young),91 or that her sentence probably would not be very long.92  
3. The Manual Is Not Amenable to Consistent Application 
a. The decentralization of principle 
Even to the limited degree that the Manual provides direction to 
individual prosecutors, that direction is unlikely to be consistently 
followed because of the degree of autonomy afforded to local U.S. 
Attorneys and the supervisors a notch below them in the pecking order.   
                                                 
82 Id. § 9-27.001. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See infra Part IV. 
86 MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.400(B). 
87 See id. § 9.27-300. 
88 See id. § 9-27.230(B). 
89 Id. § 9-27.230(B)(2). 
90 Id. § 9-27.230(B)(5). 
91 Id. § 9-27.230(B)(7). 
92 Id. § 9-27.230(B)(8). 
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At each crucial stage of prosecution, as the Manual itself 
acknowledges, it is the Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned to the case and 
his immediate supervisor who make most important policy decisions 
without concrete guidance from the Manual (or elsewhere).93  The choice 
to initiate or decline prosecution, for example, is left to the trial attorney, 
who is merely told to “weigh all relevant considerations” when 
considering whether or not there is a substantial federal interest.94 
Recently, the Wall Street Journal, in a front page article, exposed the 
unusual ways this choice is made by local prosecutors, including the 
prosecution of convenience-store robberies in Fort Worth, a crime that 
almost universally would be considered a state concern.95 
At best, this allows for a principle to exist at the level of the 
individual U.S. Attorney, who can issue directives to his assistants who 
try criminal cases.  Some see real benefits in such decentralization,96 but 
in the end this decentralization frustrates the goal of a consistent and 
national law enforcement policy.97   
By putting nearly all concrete policy-setting decisions in the hands of 
the DOJ’s trial lawyers and their immediate supervisors, it is effectively 
guaranteed that the Manual will not create consistent national 
applications.  Whether, for example, a convenience store robbery will be 
a federal concern is not resolved by a centralized, guiding principle 
articulated by the DOJ but by the whim and reasoning of the local 
prosecutor.  In Fort Worth, it may be a federal concern; in Oklahoma 
City, it may not be.98 
                                                 
93 See supra Part III.B.1-2. 
94 MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.230(A). 
95 Gary Fields, Sentencing Shift: In Criminal Trials, Venue Is Crucial but Often Arbitrary, 
WALL S.J., December 30, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WL-WSJ 98745848. 
96 See Reena Raggi, Local Concerns, Local Insights: Further Reasons for More Flexibility in 
Guideline Sentencing, 5 FED. SENT. REP. 306 (1993). 
97 To have such a policy does not destroy the ability to handle crime at the local level.  It 
is not as if there is a dearth of local law enforcement mechanisms, after all.  Even without 
federal law enforcement mechanisms, there are multiple layers of organization to address 
crime.  For example, I write this as I sit at my desk at Baylor University in Waco, Texas.  
Should I decide to cook up some methamphetamine as I write, who could burst in to arrest 
me?  Not only the Baylor police, but the Waco police, the county sheriff’s deputies, the 
Texas Rangers, officers of the Texas Department of Public Safety, or members of the 
Agriplex Task force, a multi-agency force that focuses on methamphetamine cases.  Even 
should the DEA or the FBI enter the scene, they would always be free to refer the case to 
state, rather than federal, prosecutors. 
98 Fields, supra note 95. 
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Thus, the massive Manual consumes hundreds of pages but fails to 
direct any kind of principled, consistent exercise of discretion by federal 
prosecutors, robbing our leading law enforcers of the mantle of credible 
moral authority. 
b. The problem of inconsistency 
Is it a problem that the Manual and other sources fail to consistently 
guide the employment of discretion by federal prosecutors in a 
principled way?  It is, in at least three respects:  First, it prevents the 
federal government from seizing the moral high ground (and resulting 
public support) it would receive if its criminal law efforts were directed 
by an articulated moral basis reflected in actions.  Second, it makes 
federal crime-fighting efforts nearly immune to any concrete calibration 
of success, as there is no set of articulated and principled goals defined 
against which results can be measured.99  Third, decentralization of 
principle results in a moral mushiness which has effectively withdrawn 
criminal law issues from electoral politics at the federal level. 
There is a problem when an issue as important as law enforcement is 
somehow left off the national political agenda.  Which, of course, leads to 
the question of how the articulation of principle might help to solve that 
problem.  
IV.  FOUR GOAL-ORIENTED PRINCIPLES TO CONSISTENTLY GUIDE 
DISCRETION 
What principles could be used to guide discretion?  While this 
Article does not pretend to present the full range of possibilities, it will 
describe at least four principles that could be used to guide discretion 
consistently.  As will become clear in my discussion of them, I do not 
view them as being of equal merit; I have a favorite,100 but I do not deny 
that the others would also be directive, goal-oriented, and consistently 
guide discretion.  I have chosen these four because they are the ones I 
                                                 
99 Certainly, the DOJ at times seems to measure its success against statistics, such as the 
number of prosecutions brought, defendants convicted, or changes in the crime rate.  For 
example, look at the statistics found at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2004/ 
TableofContents.htm.  What is lacking, however, is a sense of how those statistics relate to 
principled goals.  For example, an increase in the number of federal prosecutions means 
nothing in terms of crime control if it is simply replacing cases formerly dealt with by the 
states, but this may be seen as a measure of success if the principle informing prosecutorial 
action is across-the-board enforcement of federal laws. 
100 See infra Part V.B. 
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variously used to justify my actions in my own brief career as a federal 
prosecutor from 1995-2000. 
In turn, these four principles include the following:  (1) Across-the-
Board Law Enforcement, which directs that anyone who breaks a law be 
aggressively prosecuted, with the goal of convicting as many wrong-
doers as possible;101 (2) Leveling, in which the affluent and advantaged 
are treated more harshly than those who have been disadvantaged;102 (3) 
Message Sending, which seeks to achieve general deterrence through the 
use of prosecutorial discretion;103 and (4) Key-Man Targeting, which seeks 
to incapacitate those who do the most harm to society.104   
Notably, what is addressed here is precisely the prosecutorial sorting 
process that William Stuntz identifies as crucial because, “[w]hether 
prosecutors sort well determines whether the system allocates 
punishment well, or even decently.”105  My belief, built on that truth, is 
that the key to sorting well is a consistently-applied and goal-oriented 
principle.106  
In discussing these principles, one thing becomes very clear:  They 
are incompatible.107  While it may seem simple to say, for example, that I 
am for both across-the-board law enforcement and for key-man targeting, 
this is impossible.  At ground level, where real decisions must be made, 
these principles lead in opposite directions.  By definition, targeting the 
key men means targeting some people and not others, immediately 
undercutting the principle of across-the-board law enforcement, which 
calls for the prosecutor to pursue all lawbreakers with equal vigor.  
Similarly, it is a lie to say we are pursuing both message-sending and 
key-man targeting, as they lead in different directions for targeting 
defendants.108  William Stuntz, in fact, recognized that what I call across-
the-board law enforcement is incompatible with message-sending in 
                                                 
101 Infra Part IV.A. 
102 Infra Part IV.B. 
103 Infra Part IV.C. 
104 Infra Part IV.D. 
105 Stuntz, supra note 8, at 572. 
106 See infra Part V. 
107 Incompatible, at least, in the sense that they cannot be pursued effectively at the same 
time.  Like many prosecutors, I used different principles at different times, and generally 
was an across-the-board prosecutor as a new Assistant U.S. Attorney and evolved into a 
key-man practitioner by the end of my short career. 
108 This is true because there are key men even in cases where a message will not easily 
be sent, and the key man may not be the highest-profile individual yielding the strongest 
message. 
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noting that “[g]ood expression is worthless if no one can hear it . . . the 
sum of millions of arrest and prosecution decisions by thousands of 
police officers and prosecutors, seems designed to minimize 
visibility.”109  Thus, we must choose one principle or the other, because 
to say we are serving all of them is to abdicate principle at the outset.110 
Interestingly, each of the principles I describe here focuses on a 
different one of the four traditional goals of criminal sentencing:  
punishment, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation.111  Across-
the-board law enforcement is principally concerned with maximum and 
even-handed punishment; leveling is concerned primarily with social 
reconstruction or rehabilitation; message-sending is based on the idea of 
general deterrence; and key-man targeting uses incapacitation as its 
primary tool. 
A. Across-the-Board Law Enforcement 
This principle expresses an undifferentiated belief in the value of 
punishment and seeks to punish as many people as possible who break 
the law, regardless of other factors or concerns.  It views all laws as equal 
in weight and does not concern itself with relative culpability.  In short, 
it mirrors the plain language of the penal code, which draws a bright line 
between acceptable and punishable acts, and does not differentiate 
between felonies, except insofar as they are classified and subject to 
different punishments mandated by Congress. 
 The principle informing across-the-board law enforcement is 
attractive:  It reflects a profound belief in representative democracy, 
seeking to enforce equally all of those laws passed by the elected 
legislature.  It defers the prioritization of crimes to Congress and then 
accepts the laws issued by Congress at face value.   
1. Goals 
The principle of across-the-board law enforcement has the following 
two goals:  prosecute as many lawbreakers as possible, and treat them 
equally, but harshly, in sentencing (for example, by seeking the same 
maximum sentence for all defendants).  These goals are consistent with 
                                                 
109 Stuntz, supra note 8, at 522. 
110 I do not question that it is politically possible to claim multiple principles.  I do 
challenge the idea that to effectively pursue multiple principles simultaneously is possible. 
111 Patricia M. Wald, Why Focus on Women Offenders?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11 (Spring 2001) 
(listing traditional goals of sentencing). 
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the bright-line nature of this principle—there is a right and a wrong, and 
those who do wrong should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.   
To the degree that the Manual expresses any principled goal at all, it 
is this one.  For example, this principle seems to be the guiding force for 
the Manual’s suggestion that targets be charged with the “most serious 
offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant’s conduct, and 
that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction.”112  Thus, all criminals 
are to be pursued equally, regardless of most other factors (such as 
relative culpability or crime control considerations). 
2. Directives 
To sincerely put the principle of across-the-board prosecution into 
place, an Attorney General could direct that prosecutors are to charge 
anyone who has violated a federal law113 and seek the highest possible 
sentence.114  This principle would diverge considerably from the current 
language of the Manual.  For example, the current policy allows 
individual prosecutors broad discretion to decline cases due to a lack of a 
“substantial Federal interest.”115  Were the principle of a bright line 
defined by Congress taken seriously, this discretion would be severely 
limited, and trial attorneys would be directed to charge anyone who 
broke a federal law; the fact that an action is proscribed by federal law in 
itself would be seen as defining a substantial federal interest.  In other 
words, instead of substituting their own judgment for how federal 
jurisdiction should be defined, prosecutors would defer to the 
jurisdiction already defined by the legislature.   
Similarly, prosecutors could be directed to consistently seek the 
highest possible sentence for each target, revoking the current discretion 
allowed to individual Assistant U.S. Attorneys to make sentencing 
recommendations they believe to be in the “public interest.”116 
3. Consistent Application 
It certainly would be possible to prosecute anything that falls under 
federal law in federal court.  In fact, the increasing federalization of 
                                                 
112 MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.300(A). 
113 This would replace the current wishy-washy declination suggestions contained in 
§§ 9-27.200-260 of the Manual. 
114 In place of the provisions of the Manual at § 9-27.710. 
115 Id. § 9-27.230. 
116 Id. § 9-27.730. 
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criminal law117 seems to be moving in this direction.118  By focusing on 
bright lines, the across-the-board philosophy provides a very clear guide 
to cabining the actions of individual prosecutors.  However, to do so 
would be extremely expensive and inefficient, as described below. 
4. Analysis 
At a fundamental level, the across-the-board approach has some 
appeal.  It would defer to the legislative branch the responsibility of 
defining what prosecutors should address.  Such deference would make 
for great consistency.  Perhaps not surprisingly, it appears to be this 
principle that compelled Congress to affirmatively mandate that “except 
as provided by law, each U.S. Attorney, within his district, shall (1) 
Prosecute for all offenses against the United States.”119   
On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that this approach, 
while principled, is unworkable.  First of all, there are a large number of 
federal laws that overlap with state laws.120  Were the federal system to 
take on all those cases within the overlap that are currently handled by 
the states, the federal system would be quickly overwhelmed.121   
Further, this system would make it difficult for prosecutors to build 
cases around cooperating defendants.122  In a large criminal conspiracy, 
for example, this principle would urge seeking the cooperation of the 
most culpable defendants, as they are the ones with the most 
information about the largest number of potential defendants.  Thus, it 
would lead to giving a break to the most culpable defendant so as to 
convict the largest number of targets, an outcome that would be 
troubling to many.   
Finally, and most fundamentally, such a system defers decision to 
the legislature.  While this is a principled choice, and one consistent with 
                                                 
117 U.S. Sentencing Commissioner Michael O’Neill has termed it an “unrelenting 
expansion” of federal criminal law.  O’Neill, supra note 14, at 222; see also Fields, supra note 
95. 
118 Fields, supra note 95. 
119 28 U.S.C. § 547 (2000) (emphasis added). 
120 For example, federal laws almost completely overlap with state laws as to narcotics 
trafficking, a major area of law enforcement activity.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000). 
121 Suntz, supra note 8, at 507; Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Legislating Federal 
Crime and Its Consequences: Toward a Principled Basis for Federal Criminal Legislation, 543 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 15-19 (1996). 
122 The tendency to build a case around cooperators is particularly strong in the area of 
narcotics.  Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling 
and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 928 (1999). 
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the general structure of our government, it is unclear that Congress itself 
is particularly principled in legislating criminal laws and sentences.  As 
has often been observed, federal criminal jurisdiction often expands but 
rarely contracts,123 and sentences often go up but rarely go down,124 due 
to the nature of electoral politics.125  This general expansion and 
increasing harshness seems to be a function of electoral politics rather 
than a guiding principle.126 
B. Leveling 
The principle behind leveling as a guide to prosecution is simple and 
even instinctive to some.  The principle behind leveling is that criminal 
law should be harshest to those who have been most advantaged and 
less harsh to those who have been disadvantaged.  To some extent, we 
see leveling as a present impulse in criminal law; for example, in the fact 
that death penalty defendants are able to argue as a mitigating factor 
their own misfortunes in seeking to avoid the death penalty and thus are 
given an advantage not afforded those from a more privileged 
background.127  Recently, some have seen leveling as part of the DOJ’s 
motivation in the pursuit of Martha Stewart as a target of prosecution.128  
Others might think of New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer as a 
leveler, in that he has targeted the Wall Street elite for prosecution and 
civil actions.129 
                                                 
123 Stuntz, supra note 8, at 507 (“[A]ll change in criminal law seems to push in the same 
direction-toward more liability.”). 
124 Zlotnick, supra note 2, at 243 n.199. 
125 William Stuntz of Harvard has convincingly described the mechanism by which this 
occurs.  Stuntz, supra note 8, at 529-33. 
126 Id. 
127 Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990). 
128 The satirical weekly The Onion, in its own way, critiqued the Stewart sentencing with 
an article entitled Poll: Americans Feel Safer with Martha Stewart in Jail, THE ONION, October 
12, 2004, at 1.  The article fictionally quoted Chicago welder Marvin Manckowicz as saying 
that “I don’t know the technical aspects of it, but I know that Martha Stewart did 
something with the stock market. . . .  I’m not sure if she was selling her own stock or 
someone else’s, but I do know that everyone said it was wrong.  I breathed easier when I 
found out she wasn’t going to be doing any more of that again for five months.”  Id.; see also 
Stephen Moore, What’s Wrong with Insider Trading?, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, available at 
www.nationalreview.com/moore 200403090901.asp (March 9, 2004) (describing Stewart as 
a “victim of class warfare”); Wesley Pruden, Saving the Streets from Martha Stewart, 
WASHINGTON TIMES, March 9, 2004, at A4 (quoting a juror calling the verdict a victory for 
“the average guy”). 
129 E.g., Scott Walter, N.Y.’s AG Hits Bulls-Eye with Ebbers Suit, but Will It Stick?, JACKSON 
(MS) CLARION LEDGER, October 13, 2002, at 1C. 
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1. Goals 
An Attorney General motivated by leveling would assert his 
resources towards pursuing those who are advantaged and provide less 
emphasis on pursuing the poor and disadvantaged, with the goal of 
leveling off the advantages and disadvantages provided by other aspects 
of society.  In a sense, this could be considered rehabilitation for both 
types of defendant—the rich are rehabilitated by being humbled, and the 
poor are given a chance for rehabilitation through social services rather 
than prison.  That is, they are both rehabilitated by being brought to the 
middle.   
2. Directives 
A few simple directives could promote leveling.  First, it would 
target for prosecution those who are relatively powerful.  In so doing, it 
would likely prioritize cases very differently than they are today; there 
would be a lessened emphasis on street crime prosecutions and a greater 
focus on financial crimes and industrial polluters.  Within drug cases, 
this principle would lead to prosecutors being hard on the relatively 
affluent ringleaders and much less harsh on street-level users and 
dealers.130   
In drafting plea agreements and making sentencing 
recommendations, Assistant U.S. Attorney’s would also focus on relative 
advantage.  Given that the overwhelming majority of defendants are 
from the undereducated, disadvantaged parts of society, at least for 
those defendants the Attorney General could direct a much greater focus 
on rehabilitation in sentencing. 
3. Consistent Application   
Insofar as relative advantage is apparent, this principle could be 
applied with some consistency.  It would, however, require some 
research into the background of defendants prior to charging if true 
consistency was to be attained.  Some subjectivity, of course, would 
remain as to the important judgment of who is advantaged and who is 
disadvantaged—some people may consider race to be a factor, others 
                                                 
130 In some instances, the key-man principle discussed below in Part IV.D may lead to the 
same tactic, but for different reasons—the key-man prosecutor cares about the leader not 
because he is rich but because he is essential to the running of the criminal organization.  
Infra, Part IV.D. 
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may consider only economic status, and still others may want to focus 
primarily on education. 
4. Analysis 
As noted above, some may feel that leveling is already a defining 
principle in the practices of some prosecutors, such as New York 
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer.131  However, the core problem with this 
system is that it ignores the relative danger a particular target may 
present to society, and it may not even offer coincidental benefit in terms 
of lowering the crime rate.132  For example, there are many cases declined 
by federal prosecutors in which the potential danger to society outstrips 
that posed by Martha Stewart. 
Further, because of the broad scope of federal prosecution, some 
areas of crime are not easily considered by the guiding principle of 
leveling.  The important area of gun crime, for example, often would not 
allow for direction based on this principle, as relative social or economic 
advantage may not be a factor.  While leveling could be a guiding 
principle for certain decisions, particularly who to charge, it would not 
provide guidance for some broad areas of discretion. 
Also, this principle could be problematic as applied to cooperators.  
The most advantaged defendant may not be the most culpable.  For 
example, if a drug conspiracy involved several minority members from 
disadvantaged backgrounds and one rich college student, leveling might 
lead to harsher treatment of the college student, even if he were in the 
lower echelons of the organization. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the idea of leveling, 
particularly on racial or socio-economic grounds, likely violates the 
important (and constitutional) principle of equal protection.133  There is 
something innately offensive to many Americans about the idea of 
targeting people for prosecution and harsh sentences based on race, 
social class, wealth, or education.  In fact, recent trends have been to 
expressly bar such considerations in investigation and prosecution.  For 
example, racial profiling laws bar the consideration of such factors in 
                                                 
131 Supra note 129. 
132 The across-the-board principle, though it does not have crime control as a central goal, 
will probably achieve some measure of crime control simply by addressing so much of the 
population. 
133 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, § 5H1.10 (2004). 
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police investigations,134 and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have 
strictly barred race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-
economic status from consideration in sentencing.135 
In short, leveling may be appealing to some as social policy, but as a 
basis for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the use of wealth, 
education, and race as sorting factors raises practical problems and 
would invite attack as being contrary to the principle of equal protection 
both as embodied in the Constitution of the United States136 and as 
expressed otherwise in contemporary society. 
C. Message Sending 
A third guiding principle for prosecution might be to construct 
prosecutions so as to send a message to prospective lawbreakers, in 
order to lower crime by deterring others through fear of punishment.  
The underlying principle here is that crime control is most important and 
that general deterrence is the best way to control crime.137   
Message sending has clearly been a motivating principle to many 
prosecutors, though rarely in a systemic way.  For example, when he was 
the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Rudolph 
Giuliani often had targets arrested in the most public way possible.138  
Wall Street traders were arrested at their offices, then paraded past their 
colleagues in handcuffs, a calculated spectacle meant to send a clear 
message to those colleagues and others who might see the event on the 
evening news.139  It cannot be doubted that this was intended to send a 
message to others. 
Giuliani had other tactics for message-sending as well.  For example, 
he chose one day a week to be “federal day,” in which all street-level 
drug dealers were taken to federal instead of state court where they 
received much higher sentences.  One such dealer, who would have been 
                                                 
134 For example, Texas law flatly states that “[a] peace officer may not engage in racial 
profiling.”  TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2.131 (Vernon 2003). 
135 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, § 5H1.10 (2004). 
136 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
137 By general deterrence I mean something done to deter people other than the 
defendant; I would term things done to deter the defendant himself specific deterrence. 
138 Shaun G. Clarke, Beware Collision of Politics and Public Relations, NEW ORLEANS TIMES 
PICAYUNE, August 1, 2002, at Metro p. 6. 
139 Id. 
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subjected to a four-year term in state court, received life without parole 
in federal court. 140   
1. Goals 
The principle goal of message sending is to reduce crime through 
general deterrence.  It tries to do so efficiently, by using a few high-
profile cases to convey the message of deterrence, in the hope of 
avoiding a larger number of crimes down the road because the potential 
criminals were deterred.   
Interestingly, unlike leveling, a crime-control system can measure its 
results in a direct way; success would mean a decrease in crime rates.  
Thus, it offers an advantage over some other systems within the larger 
system of political debate in that it can be held to an objective standard. 
2. Directives 
To employ message sending, the Attorney General would have to 
require a conscious use of the media.  Press coverage would be sought of 
the arrests, arraignments, pleas, trials, and sentencing of key targets.  
Central to the idea of message sending is that the message is 
communicated.141   
As to the discrete decisions that constitute prosecutorial discretion, 
the targeting of defendants would certainly be affected—those targets 
most likely to have an emotional impact on the public are best chosen.  
However, in many cases, where none of the potential targets have a high 
profile, the principle of message-sending offers little guidance. 
Similarly, as to the selection of who is going to be given an 
opportunity to cooperate, only limited direction could be offered.  
Ideally, low-profile targets would be offered the opportunity to testify 
against high-profile targets.  Again, however, this directive does not 
apply in cases where none of the targets have a high profile. 
3.   Consistent Application 
As to those areas where this policy could be directive, it would be 
amenable to consistent application.  However, one area of subjectivity is 
                                                 
140 Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few:  New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for 
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 1000-01 (1995). 
141 Some may claim that messages are best sent through the informal network of 
neighborhoods and jails, but such communications are almost impossible to measure. 
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the decision as to which targets are high-profile.  That could depend on 
the local media and sense of the community and would vary from place 
to place.   
4. Analysis 
Message sending has an obvious attraction:  It provides a possible 
way to reduce crime without having to convict all those who violate the 
law.  This system relies on relatively fewer convictions to deter others 
from committing crimes. 
There are problems, however.  First, as discussed above, in many 
cases, perhaps even the majority of cases, message sending is not 
possible because none of the potential targets are likely to garner much 
attention.  Thus, this principle simply does not affect many of the 
prosecutorial exercises of discretion made at the federal level. 
Second, this plan relies on effective communication of the message 
being sent.  In turn, this means a reliance on the media with which many 
would be uncomfortable.  Media outlets, of course, have their own biases 
and motivations that have little to do with justice or crime control.  At 
any rate, there is not much precedent for effective, measurable message 
sending.142   
Finally, message sending relies on the assumption that criminals are 
rational in their actions—that is, that they weigh the costs and benefits of 
committing a crime before they act.  Even if this is true, it is more likely 
to be accurate with relation to some crimes (financial fraud, tax evasion) 
than others (manslaughter). 
D. Key-Man Targeting 
Like message sending, key-man targeting reflects the core belief that 
crime control is the primary goal of criminal law.  It differs from message 
sending, however, in the way it attempts to lower crime rates.  Rather 
than seeking general deterrence, key-man targeting attempts to lower 
crime by incapacitating those relatively few individuals who make many 
crimes possible.  It does so by targeting two types of individual 
defendants, the dangerous recidivist and the key members of 
conspiracies or other criminal networks who have the rarest skills.  
                                                 
142 Stuntz, supra note 8, at 522.  Stuntz notes that “if expressive criminal law is an ideal, 
the ideal is at odds with the system of law and law enforcement we now have.”  Id. at 523. 
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Dangerous recidivists are usually identified by their criminal histories.143  
Key members of conspiracies or criminal networks, in contrast, are 
identified by examining their roles in offenses.  In either case, this 
principle reflects the belief that a relatively small number of people 
either commit many crimes or make many crimes possible.144  
Intriguingly, as applied to criminal networks and conspiracies, key-man 
targeting takes advantage of market forces to reduce crime.145  For 
example, one might consider the problem of the theft of car radios on a 
military base.  While the across-the-board adherent would attempt to 
convict every thief and the message-sender might seek media attention 
for the conviction of a few of these thieves, the key-man targeter is going 
to turn his sights elsewhere:  toward the out-of-state fence who buys 
large volumes of the stolen goods.  By taking away the market for stolen 
goods, he can control crime with fewer convictions.146  The thieves 
would be given much lesser sentences or sent to the state for 
punishment,147 with breaks given to those who provide worthwhile 
cooperation.148  
Key-man targeting must take specific account of the market realities, 
including labor markets, of the businesses in which large conspiracies 
engage.  For example, elsewhere I have described the crack trade at the 
street level as being analogous to a bagel shop.149  The crack trade, like 
the bagel trade, is a business, and both rely on similar labor markets. 
Within the crack business, powder cocaine is usually converted to 
crack on stovetops by people at the bottom rungs of the organization.  
                                                 
143 The current federal sentencing Guidelines already go far towards the long-term 
incapacitation of such recidivists through provisions such as the career criminal provision, 
which mandates long terms for violent felons and drug offenders who have at least two 
prior convictions for that type of offense.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, § 4B1.1 (2004). 
144 Note that this is distinct from the other crime-control system discussed here, such as 
message sending, which is neutral on how many potential law-breakers there are. 
145 By “market forces,” I mean either supply or demand of a commodity or service.  Thus, 
cutting off the supply of precursor chemicals (such as anhydrous ammonia) through 
administrative action would make the manufacture of methamphetamine nearly 
impossible. 
146 Of course, to be effective, one must truly go after the key man as opposed to trying to 
affect market forces by arresting large numbers of people.  This is true for the simple reason 
that key men with special skills are hard to replace; drug users are easy to replace. 
147 Some prosecutors already use this tactic individually.  However, to do so they must 
pursue an individual more difficult to catch than the thief—to prove the fence guilty, the 
prosecutor must prove that the fence knew the goods were stolen.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2313 
(2000). 
148 The sentencing guidelines, of course, already provide for a break for cooperation.  U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, § 5K1.1 (2004). 
149 Osler, Must Have Got Lost, supra note 20, at 679 n.197. 
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Now think of your neighborhood bagel shop.  Walk into that shop, and 
you will see relatively low-paid employees making and selling the 
bagels—the labor, in the same position as those who cook cocaine into 
crack.  They convert the dough shipped to the store into the end product, 
bagels.  The business is structured such that these low-paid workers can 
be easily replaced in the inevitable event the store suffers high turnover.  
The evidence is easy to see:  The instructions to make the bagels are 
posted on the wall.  The process is kept simple, and jobs are specialized 
to limit the amount of skill needed.  If the goal is to close down that 
bagel shop, it would be futile to address the problem by arresting the 
counter help and bagel makers because the shop is structured for them to 
be easily replaced.150  Instead, one would have to incapacitate the key 
men and women in the chain—those who control logistics, financing, or 
management through specialized skills not so easily replaced.151 
The essence of key-man targeting is to pay much less attention to the 
easily-replaced “bagel makers” and refocus resources to catching and 
incapacitating the members of the network who are much less easily 
replaced.152  After all, once the business owners with the ability to bring 
in the dough and buy the machines are gone, there is no one to employ 
the bagel makers.153 
1. Goals 
The key-man targeter is relatively single-minded toward the goal of 
reducing crime.  This is capable of measurement and analysis, and 
success can be precisely evaluated.  A follower of this principled tactic is 
probably going to take some political heat, as it would require that some 
crimes presently prosecuted in federal court would be turned over to the 
state or not prosecuted—maintaining this goal would probably make it 
impossible to claim to be addressing all violations of criminal law. 
                                                 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 The “bagel makers,” of course, still have value to the system as informants and 
witnesses, and those who cooperated would be treated to the most significant breaks.  
However, they would be treated much more lightly than they are now whether or not they 
cooperated with the government and would not be charged to the fullest extent possible, as 
the DOJ currently directs.  MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.300. 
153 The reverse does not work—if you take away the bagel makers, the business owner 
does not go away; rather, he just hires some more workers.  He has structured his business, 
after all, to allow for the easy replacement of these often transient workers. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 [2005], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss3/2
2005] Discretion by Federal Prosecutors 653 
2. Directives 
An Attorney General implementing key-man targeting would make 
several specific directives to federal prosecutors.  First, she would revise 
the standards for selecting prosecution targets so that the primary basis 
for selection would be the direct effect on crime control.  This would 
have concrete effects.  For example, as discussed above, in addressing 
narcotics such an Attorney General would focus direct investigations 
toward those who have the key business skills that make such a drug 
organization work and are not easily replaceable:  the money managers, 
the logistics men, and the importers.  Street-level dealers and users 
would not be subjected to the same treatment. 
At each stage of the process, the same imperatives would apply.  
Plea agreements would be structured so that those who are easily 
replaceable in a conspiracy would testify against those who are not 
easily replaceable.  In sentencing, prosecutors would be specifically 
directed to seek long, incapacitating sentences against those who are 
most crucial to crime control.  As a result, a prosecutor would seek a 
long sentence against the man who establishes a sophisticated boiler-
room fraud operation but not for the operator who is paid to make the 
calls.154 
3. Consistent Application 
Key-man targeting would allow for consistent application of 
principle over a broad array of cases.  While in conspiracy cases it would 
direct the irreplaceable to be targeted rather than the easily replaced, this 
principled tactic provides guidance even when the crime is committed 
by individual actors.  In such cases, the targets would be evaluated 
according to the long-term threats they pose in the context of the larger 
picture.  For example, a drug possessor would be unlikely to be 
prosecuted to the fullest extent possible, provided key parts of the drug 
network supplying him are being addressed.  On the other hand, a two-
time bank robber would be seen as an appropriate target for lengthy 
incapacitation because he poses a significant future risk, even absent the 
involvement of others.  Even in the most mundane single-defendant 
cases, this principle would be directive by emphasizing the factor of 
criminal history, making repeat offenders much more important targets 
                                                 
154 This would be a different tactic than that urged by the current Manual and its directive 
to seek the maximum charge for each defendant.  See MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.300 
(providing that the person making the calls and the man running the operation may well 
be charged with the same crime). 
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than first offenders.  The theory is that the recidivist is more likely to 
cause more crime in the future and needs to be incapacitated.155 
Of course, some areas of subjectivity would remain, creating 
inconsistencies from district to district.  For example, the determination 
of who was a key-man, in most cases, would still be made locally and 
would be subject to varying interpretations. 
4. Analysis 
Because key-man prosecution is used as an example in the following 
section, much of the analysis of this principle is provided there.156  
However, it should be noted that while key-man prosecution could 
achieve the goal of reducing specific types of crime, it would have the 
side effect of limiting the scope of federal prosecution.  Entire categories 
of crime that are currently addressed by federal prosecutors (such as 
drug possession) would be left to the states.  Given the apparent impulse 
of Congress to constantly enlarge federal criminal jurisdiction,157 the 
required contraction of the scope of actual federal prosecutions (albeit 
with the goal of greater gains) may prove to be politically unpopular. 
V.  THE CHANGES PRINCIPLE WOULD BRING 
A.   The Problems of a Decentralized System 
Before describing what principle-based centralized guidance of 
prosecutorial discretion would do to federal criminal law, this Part 
reviews the problems caused by the lack of such an articulated principle, 
previously addressed in Part III.B.3.b. 
1. Decentralization Muddies Morality 
The present lack of a national organizing principle prevents the 
federal government from being a secular moral force within the nation.158  
Federal prosecutions, such as the Martha Stewart case, are often a topic 
                                                 
155 Key-man targeting may even lead to incapacitation of serious recidivists more harsh 
than those that result under a straightforward application of the Guidelines.  The Booker 
opinion, after all, would allow the judge to set aside the guideline range and value criminal 
history as a more important component than is reflected in the Guideline calculation.  See 
Booker v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
156 See infra Part V. 
157 Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 121, at 15-19. 
158 However one chooses to define morality, it will include principle.  Thus, to be moral, 
our government must first be principled.  The reverse, of course, is not true—one can hold 
principles that are immoral. 
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of national discussion or debate, but each case seems to reflect a different 
goal and a different morality.  For example, Martha Stewart seems to be 
a case of leveling, and at any rate, it cannot be defended on crime control 
grounds.  Obviously, a different goal must motivate the continuing 
prosecution of street-level drug dealers by federal agencies.  Thus, any 
larger message or goal is swallowed up in the inevitable 
inconsistencies.159  
2. Decentralization Makes It Impossible to Measure Success 
Though crime statistics and prosecution numbers are often 
trumpeted by the DOJ, without a moral center there is no set of 
articulated and principled goals against which results can be measured.  
Success is consistently declared without a true meaning.   
3. Decentralization Takes Criminal Law out of the National Political 
Debate 
Finally, decentralization of principle means there are no articulations 
of principle to debate.  Though I do not advocate the direct election of 
the Attorney General or U.S. Attorneys, a public articulation of guiding 
principles beyond standing against crime and for fairness would allow 
for a worthwhile debate of criminal law issues during the run-up to 
national elections. 
B. What a National, Principled System Might Look Like 
Part IV, in a very brief way, sets out the way four directive, goal-
oriented, and consistent principles to guide prosecutorial discretion on a 
national basis might look.  To better understand the results from such a 
change, consider one such hypothetical, the key-man crime control 
system.  To put this principle into effect, the Attorney General would 
first have to publicly name and claim that principle, while honestly 
conceding this would mean that some other principles (for example, 
across-the-board enforcement) would not be pursued.  
Second, the Attorney General would have to make the Manual more 
directive, more binding, and thoroughly attuned to the principle 
articulated.  That would require the following changes (using key-man 
targeting as an example): 
                                                 
159 Those inconsistencies are inevitable in large part because of the over-criminalization 
others have so well described.  Stuntz, supra note 8. 
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1. The Attorney General Would Publicly State the Principle 
The Attorney General seems to have a wealth of media attention.  
She should, upon deciding on a principle goal for federal prosecution, 
state that principled goal clearly and publicly, including the measures by 
which the successful attainment of that goal will be evaluated.   
2. The Manual Would Become Directive and Binding 
No longer could the Manual effectively allow nearly every direction 
relating to the exercise of discretion to be defined at the local level.  
Rather, the Manual would have to present itself as mandatory 
instructions in approaching individual cases,160 and the evaluation of 
individual prosecutors and supervisors would need to be based on how 
well those directions were followed.  No longer could each prosecutor be 
a separate moral force, and no longer would the fate of a defendant 
depend largely on which Assistant U.S. Attorney received responsibility 
for the case. 
Rather than leaving the acceptance or declination of cases largely up 
to the whims of individual prosecutors, much firmer guidelines would 
have to be designed.161  For example, to reflect the key-man principle, the 
federal prosecution of drug possessors and street-level dealers might be 
limited,162 as there is a potentially endless supply, and the process of 
incarcerating them does not seem to stem the tide.  In other cases, 
prosecutors would be directed to accept only those cases where the 
incapacitation of the defendant would realistically deprive others of the 
ability to commit crimes in the future or who individually pose a special 
risk of future danger.  This is a net through which Martha Stewart or a 
                                                 
160 Ironically, perhaps, as the sentencing guidelines become advisory rather than binding 
under Booker, I am suggesting that the Manual become more binding and less advisory.  
However, it is important to recognize that the more binding nature of the Manual simply 
means that the Attorney General would hold U.S. Attorneys and their assistants to the 
directives of the Manual through administrative action, and I do not contemplate creating a 
right of action through which defendants could seek to hold individual prosecutors to 
those directives, as discussed below. 
161 Much firmer than those found in sections 9-27.200-260 of the Manual. 
162 It would need to be limited in a way which allowed for there to still be pressure on 
such defendants to cooperate with the investigation.  Such pressure, of course, can still be 
applied even when relative sentences are reduced or cases shifted to state prosecution.  If 
the defendant stays in the federal system, he could be recommended for a sentence of 
probation, for example, if otherwise appropriate.  If he is shifted to the state system, the 
prosecutor would have to cooperate closely with her colleague in the District Attorney’s 
office. 
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drug possessor would not pass, but the drug importer, the internet fraud 
master and the counterfeiting printer would. 
The selection of charges and formulation of plea agreements would 
follow the same principle, of course—rather than seeking the highest 
available charge against everyone, prosecutors would be directed to seek 
the highest available charge against those who would make the most 
difference through employment of their skills or future dangerousness. 
Similarly, key-man prosecution would lead to the fairly specific goal, 
which is related to sentencing, incapacitating those who are most crucial 
to criminal networks or pose the greatest risk of committing serious 
federal crimes in the future.  As to those targets, the key-man prosecutor 
has little use for the traditional sentencing goals of retribution, general 
deterrence, or rehabilitation.  Thus, at least to those defendants, the goal 
of incapacitation would eclipse the others.  As to non-key targets, 
however (for example, those lesser lights who cooperated against the 
kingpin), this principle would allow for a much broader consideration of 
rehabilitation than is seen in contemporary criminal law.  Prosecutors 
would lock up the ones who make crime work and try to fix those who 
would be easily replaced anyways. 
However, this does not mean that the Manual would create a cause 
of action for defendants.  Quite simply, it would be wise to retain that 
part of the present Manual that provides that it does not “create a right or 
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party to 
litigation with the United States.”163 
C. Benefits and Drawbacks of a National, Principled System 
1. Benefits 
Were the DOJ to accept the key-man principle and adopt the 
proposals set out above, several benefits seem obvious.  First, it would 
address the problems of decentralization as described.  Specifically, it 
would allow the DOJ to take a moral high ground and consistently 
defend its actions.  Success could be measured over the long term against 
the specific goal of crime control in target areas of federal concern, and 
the key-man principle could be openly debated in the context of national 
elections.   
                                                 
163 MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.150. 
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It would also save money while very possibly achieving better 
results.  Because key-man prosecution uses market forces to achieve 
crime control (without a fence, there is no demand market for the thief; 
without the cocaine, there is no supply market for the street-level 
narcotics dealer), it would no longer be necessary to spend millions of 
dollars prosecuting and incarcerating lower-level criminals.  At the same 
time, some areas of crime, such as gun offenses not related to illegal 
interstate sales, could be left to the states.   
 Finally, there is a fairness achieved through employment of this 
principle in a centralized way.  The lottery aspect of federal criminal law, 
based on what jurisdiction a defendant is in and which prosecutor is 
assigned a given case, would decline.  Simultaneously, and indirectly, 
this would eliminate or deemphasize some current practices that have 
subjected the DOJ to harsh criticism, such as the disproportionate 
treatment of crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine.164 
2. Drawbacks 
The two groups that would lose power under the key-man regime 
described here are Congress and local federal prosecutors.  There is no 
doubt that many congressmen would chafe at the fact that some federal 
laws were being enforced with less vigor, but they would be relatively 
powerless to change the choices made by the Attorney General.  U.S. 
Attorneys and their Assistants, similarly, would be subject to more 
binding direction and would be allowed less freedom to employ 
prosecutorial discretion.  Therefore, they could be expected to object to 
this loss of power. 
States may object to such a reapportionment of responsibility, as 
well, given that it would be expected to, at least temporarily, raise the 
caseloads of state prosecutors.  In the longer term, of course, success in 
crime control would be to the ultimate advantage of the state. 
Obviously, the key-man system would work best in top-down rather 
than bottom-up investigations, and this might take some changes to the 
prevailing culture of investigation.  That is, it would be most efficient to 
target the key man directly, rather than relying on the cooperation of a 
number of underlings seeking plea deals.  This would require the 
cultivation of new tactics.  For example, rather than testimony, 
                                                 
164 Because crack cocaine is formulated by street level dealers out of powder cocaine, it is 
unlikely that those holding small amounts of crack cocaine would be considered “key 
men.” 
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investigators may be better off emphasizing wiretaps to capture the 
conversations of key men, a technique that has the added advantage of 
being more reliable.  Federal officials could also use their heightened 
access to intelligence information to reverse the process and start by 
investigating those at the top of the pyramid, for example by examining 
international financial transaction data. 
Finally, commitment to key-man prosecution would represent a 
political risk.  The articulation of a principled goal and the ready ability 
to measure success also means that the goal can be attacked and failures 
will be apparent. 
The fact there is a risk, however, is not a reason to avoid action.  In 
the end, we remember and revere the bold.  In this time of tumult,165 the 
field of sentencing calls out for an expression of principle from a source 
chosen by the President to represent us all:  the Attorney General of the 
United States. 
                                                 
165  See supra Part I.A. 
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